The Australian government promotes Build-to-Rent (BTR) as a solution to Australia’s housing affordability crisis. It is not. BTR is a tax-advantaged financial product that systematically transfers residential property wealth from private Australian individuals to institutional capital. The 2026-27 Federal Budget accelerated this transfer by stripping away tax tools for individual investors whilst preserving and expanding institutional advantages. Working-class Australians are the primary casualties.
BTR only works through premium rents and tax engineering, not genuine affordability.
- Federal and state concessions are structured for institutional capital. Private developers are excluded.
- The 2026-27 Budget abolished negative gearing and the 50% CGT discount for individuals. Companies and institutional BTR structures are exempt from these measures.
- The March 2026 pension fund MoU shows coordinated institutional lobbying, two months before the Budget delivered the requested policy changes.
- The WEF’s “you’ll own nothing” framework and Australia’s BTR policy architecture are functionally identical.
I’ve been developing property across Australia for over 40 years. I specialise in 30- to 80-apartment projects. I understand Australian development feasibility at a granular level. I want to be direct with you: Build-to-Rent is not a housing affordability solution. It is a tax-advantaged, capital-intensive product that systematically dismantles private wealth creation and deepens Australia’s dependence on rental housing.
The Feasibility Problem Nobody Mentions
Construction costs across Australia’s major cities range from $300,000 to $510,000 per apartment for an average 75 sqm unit with car parking. In Sydney and Melbourne, costs are at the upper end of that range. The figure depends on whether you build low-rise, mid-rise, or high-rise.
Here’s the problem.
All three building types attract roughly the same market rent in any given suburb or postcode. A two-bedroom apartment in the same Australian suburb commands similar rent whether it is in a three-storey walk-up or a fifteen-storey tower. Construction costs vary by 70%. Rent does not.
This creates inherent yield compression. The higher you build, the worse your return on equity. Mid-rise and high-rise BTR developments are structurally weaker investments than lower-rise build-to-sell projects.
The only way to make BTR viable is via tax engineering and premium rents.
If your affordable housing model only works by charging premium rents and relying on tax concessions, it’s a financial product, not a housing solution.
Key Point: BTR’s economics don’t work without subsidies and premium rents. That makes it a financial instrument, not a genuine housing solution.
The Two-Tier Tax System
BTR developments receive substantial tax advantages that private developers cannot access.
Federal concessions:
- 4% accelerated capital works deduction (standard rate: 2.5%)
- 15% MIT withholding tax on rental and capital gain income (standard rate: 30%)
State concessions:
- Approximately 50% land tax reductions
- Exemptions from foreign surcharges
- Concessions typically run for 20 to 30 years in most states. NSW made them indefinite from the 2026 land tax year.
Eligibility requirements:
- Minimum 50 dwellings
- Single-entity ownership for 15 years
- Professional management
- 10% affordable dwelling component at 74.9% of market rent
- Five-year lease terms
These conditions are designed for institutional capital. A private developer undertaking a 20-unit infill project cannot access these concessions. A developer with scattered holdings across multiple sites cannot qualify.
This is a deliberately engineered two-tier tax system. One set of rules for institutions. Another for everyone else.
Key Point: BTR eligibility thresholds aren’t administrative details. They’re gatekeeping mechanisms that redirect tax advantages exclusively to large institutional players.
How Government Policy Deliberately Stifles Small-Scale Residential Development
The BTR tax concession structure isn’t merely designed to attract institutional capital. It’s explicitly structured to exclude and disadvantage small-scale private developers, who have historically delivered the majority of Australia’s residential housing supply.
The 50-dwelling minimum threshold is not an administrative convenience. It’s a barrier to entry. Most residential development across Australian cities and regional centres occurs through projects of 10 to 40 units: infill sites, subdivision conversions, and medium-density townhouse developments. These projects account for the bulk of new housing supply in suburbs from Brisbane’s inner ring to Melbourne’s middle ring to Perth’s growth corridors. They’re delivered by private developers with local knowledge, manageable risk exposure, and direct accountability to buyers and communities.
None of these developers can access the BTR concessions.
A developer building a 30-unit apartment project receives no land tax concession, no accelerated depreciation, no MIT withholding tax advantage, and no foreign surcharge exemption. They compete on price with institutional operators who receive all of these advantages whilst delivering the same product to the same market.
This is not market competition. It’s state-sponsored market distortion.
The government actively subsidises large corporate developments whilst maintaining full tax and regulatory burdens on smaller operators. Projects that were financially viable five years ago no longer are. Developers who would have commenced feasibility studies now can’t justify the risk.
The result is a contraction in housing supply from the very operators who have always provided it.
Private developers don’t have access to foreign pension fund capital. They don’t structure through widely held trusts. They don’t employ teams of tax lawyers to optimise MIT distributions. They borrow from Australian banks, sell to local buyers, and operate on margins that government tax policy can easily render unviable.
When you offer a 50% land tax discount to developments with more than 50 units and none to those under that threshold, you’re not encouraging housing supply. You’re consolidating the market in favour of institutional-scale players.
When you exempt BTR structures from negative gearing restrictions while removing the same tax treatment for individual investors, you’re systematically reallocating capital away from distributed private ownership and toward concentrated corporate control.
The government’s housing policy isn’t failing. It’s succeeding exactly as designed. It replaces a distributed, competitive, and locally responsive development sector with a centralised, subsidised, institutionally controlled one.
Small developers aren’t asking for subsidies. They’re asking for a level playing field. Remove BTR tax advantages entirely, and private developers will deliver more housing, faster and at lower cost than any subsidised corporate structure ever could.
But that’s not the objective. The objective is control. Control requires scale, and scale requires eliminating the competition.
Key Point: BTR concession thresholds actively exclude small developers who build most of Australia’s housing, concentrating supply and ownership in institutional hands.
Why BTR Needs Tax Subsidies and Premium Rents
The per-unit build cost spread I mentioned earlier undermines the feasibility of unsubsidised BTR across most Australian markets.
Rents don’t keep pace with construction costs. Yield erodes. Return on equity collapses.
Even corporate BTR is only marginally viable. That viability depends on premium rents and sophisticated financial structures that smaller players cannot access.
The affordable dwellings requirement is window dressing. Only 10% of units must be rented at 74.9% of the market rate. The other 90% cross-subsidise this token affordability through premium pricing.
Australia currently has around 23,000 BTR apartments in operation, under construction, or in planning. That’s roughly 0.2% of the total residential housing stock.
The MIT withholding tax concession delivers a return improvement of around 0.5% for foreign investors. BTR investments deliver social infrastructure-type returns. They attract patient capital: pension and super funds.
These are not high-return investments. They’re tax-advantaged, long-term holdings that institutional investors can absorb. Private developers cannot.
Key Point: BTR’s 10% affordability component is cross-subsidised by 90% premium-priced units. The affordability framing doesn’t hold up to basic arithmetic.
The Dismantling of Private Wealth Creation
The 2026-27 Budget abolished negative gearing for established properties purchased after 1 July 2027. Any purchase contracted after 7:30 pm on 12 May 2026 is affected.
Investors can no longer offset rental losses against salary or other personal income. Losses can be offset only against residential rental income or future capital gains. Carry-forward rules add a compliance burden without restoring the original benefit.
Existing owners are grandfathered. New builds, BTR structures, and widely held trusts are exempt.
The sequence is deliberate.
- Remove investor tax benefits
- Reduce private rental supply
- Rents rise
- Renters are pushed toward corporate BTR stock
- Institutional owners gain market share and control
The policy simultaneously strips private investors of tax tools whilst preserving and expanding them for institutional capital.
Resale values on new builds are also constrained. Future buyers can’t access the same negative gearing treatment as they do for established property. The purchaser who bought a new build in 2027 will struggle to sell in 2037 because the next buyer faces a worse tax position.
This is perhaps the most significant change to property tax legislation in a generation.
Key Point: The changes to negative gearing follow a clear sequence: remove individual tax tools, shrink the private rental supply, and drive renters towards corporate BTR stock.
The Working-Class Wealth Ladder Has Been Removed
For generations, residential property investment was the primary wealth-creation mechanism available to ordinary Australians. Teachers, nurses, tradespeople, police officers, small business owners: people who earn wages rather than income from capital. Across every Australian state and territory, these individuals used negative gearing and the CGT discount to build assets, secure their finances, and pass wealth to their children.
This wasn’t a tax loophole. It was the working-class path to financial independence.
The wealthy don’t need negative gearing. They have access to family trusts, corporate structures, equity portfolios, business interests, and offshore arrangements. They diversify across asset classes and use tax advisers to optimise outcomes.
Working-class Australians don’t have those options. They have wages. They have superannuation they can’t access for decades. And they had the ability to buy an Australian investment property, absorb short-term losses against their salary, and build equity over time through Australia’s long-term capital growth cycle.
The 2026-27 Budget specifically targets that pathway.
By abolishing negative gearing on established properties, the Australian government removed the mechanism that allowed a nurse earning $85,000 a year to buy a second property anywhere from Parramatta to Geelong to Ipswich, cover the shortfall between rent and mortgage payments by offsetting it against her taxable income, and build wealth through capital growth.
By removing the 50% CGT discount, the government eliminated the tax treatment that made property investment financially viable for those on marginal tax rates of 32.5% or 37%.
Working Australians can no longer use property investment as a wealth-building tool. Corporations, institutional investors, and large-scale operators, who already had structural advantages, retain their concessions and gain additional ones.
This isn’t housing policy. It’s class-based wealth redistribution.
The government frames these changes as addressing housing affordability and helping first home buyers. But removing a mid-career professional’s ability to purchase an investment property doesn’t increase the housing supply. It doesn’t make homes cheaper. It transfers control of residential property from individuals to institutions.
The outcome is a permanent renter class. People who would have become landlords remain tenants. Wealth that would have been accumulated by families instead flows to corporate landlords as rent.
For most Australians, property investment has never been about speculation. It has been about security. It has been the only realistic way for someone without a family trust or a seven-figure salary to accumulate assets, generate passive income in retirement, and provide for their children. That is as true in Townsville as it is in Toorak.
That ladder has been pulled up, and the people holding it are telling you it’s for your own good.
Key Point: The tax tools removed by the 2026-27 Budget were the primary wealth-creation mechanisms for ordinary wage earners. The wealthy had alternatives. Working-class Australians did not.
The CGT Advantage: Corporate Structures Win, Individuals Lose
The same Budget that dismantled negative gearing also restructured capital gains tax in ways that systematically favour corporate property ownership over individual investment.
From 1 July 2027, the 50% CGT discount is abolished for Australian resident individuals, trusts, and partnerships. It’s replaced by cost base indexation and a 30% minimum tax rate on capital gains.
This sounds reasonable until you examine who is exempt.
Companies are unaffected. They already pay 30% tax on capital gains with no discount. The CGT changes don’t alter their position. Existing CGT settings continue to apply to companies, superannuation funds, and life insurance companies.
Widely held trusts, the structures used by institutional BTR operators, are also exempt from the negative gearing restrictions. Managed Investment Trusts (MITs), which hold most BTR stock, retain their tax advantages whilst individual investors lose theirs.
The wealth transfer is structural and deliberate.
Before these changes, an individual investor who sold an investment property after holding it for more than 12 months received a 50% CGT discount and paid tax on half the gain. A company holding the same asset paid 30% tax on the full gain.
After 1 July 2027, the individual loses the 50% discount and pays a minimum 30% tax on the indexed gain. The company’s position remains unchanged.
Individual investors now face the same effective CGT burden as companies, but without access to the corporate tax structures, institutional-scale advantages, land tax concessions, or MIT withholding tax benefits available to corporations.
The tax system has been rebalanced, not to promote housing affordability, but to systematically disadvantage private property ownership in favour of institutional control.
If you’re a private investor, you lose negative gearing and the CGT discount. If you’re a large corporate BTR operator structured as a widely held trust, you retain your tax advantages while gaining new concessions.
This isn’t tax reform. It’s wealth redistribution from individuals to institutions.
Key Point: Companies were always exempt from the CGT discount. The Budget equalised individual and corporate tax treatment, but without giving individuals any of the institutional advantages that make that burden bearable for corporations.
This Is Not Just Australian Policy. It’s Part of a Global Pattern.
The Smoking Gun: The March 2026 Pension Fund Coordination
On Wednesday, 4 March 2026, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney attended a breakfast hosted by IFM Investors in Sydney, a major Australian industry super fund manager. Australia’s Assistant Treasurer, Dr Daniel Mulino MP, and Canada’s Minister of Finance, François-Philippe Champagne, were also present.
The breakfast served as the centrepiece of a landmark investment agreement: the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Australian superannuation funds and Canadian pension funds to collaborate on infrastructure investments and lobby for policy changes that facilitate capital deployment in both countries.
Canadian pension funds that signed: CPP Investments, AIMCo, BCI, La Caisse (CDPQ), HOOPP, IMCO, OMERS, OTPP, and PSP Investments.
Australian signatories: AustralianSuper, Australian Retirement Trust, Aware Super, Cbus Super, HESTA, Hostplus, Rest, CareSuper, and IFM Investors.
This wasn’t a casual industry networking event. It was a coordinated agreement among some of the world’s largest institutional capital pools to explicitly lobby for policy changes that facilitate their capital deployment, including in residential property.
The timeline is revealing. March 2026: pension funds sign an MoU to lobby for favourable policy. May 2026: the Australian Federal Budget delivers BTR tax concessions, removes negative gearing for individuals, abolishes the CGT discount for private investors, and structurally advantages institutional property ownership.
Two months between the signing of the agreement and the policy delivery.
This isn’t speculation. This is documented coordination. The world’s largest pension funds formally agreed to collaborate and lobby governments for policy changes. Those policy changes appeared in the Budget eight weeks later.
BTR is not a housing policy. It’s an institutional investment product designed for and by the entities that signed this MoU. The tax concessions, land tax discounts, and structural advantages are not accidental features. They’re the policy outcomes these institutions explicitly lobbied for.
When Klaus Schwab speaks about stakeholder capitalism and the Fourth Industrial Revolution, this is the mechanism. It’s not abstract ideology. It’s institutional capital coordinating across borders, lobbying finance ministers, and securing policy architecture that transfers ownership of residential property from individuals to corporations.
The MoU makes it explicit: these institutions view housing as infrastructure. Not as homes. Not as wealth-building assets for families. As infrastructure, an asset class to be controlled, managed, and extracted from at scale.
The Australian government didn’t independently develop BTR policy. It delivered what institutional capital requested.
Key Point: The March 2026 MoU is evidence of coordinated institutional lobbying. The May 2026 Budget delivered the exact policy outcomes those institutions requested, eight weeks later.
In 2016, the World Economic Forum released a video titled “8 Predictions for the World in 2030.” The first prediction: “You’ll own nothing. And you’ll be happy.”
Klaus Schwab, founder and executive chairman of the WEF, has consistently promoted the “Fourth Industrial Revolution”: a vision in which access replaces ownership, subscription models dominate consumption, and large institutions control assets while individuals rent everything from homes to vehicles to tools.
BTR isn’t an isolated Australian housing policy. It’s the residential property manifestation of this ideology.
The mechanics are identical. Private ownership is systematically discouraged by tax policy. Institutional ownership is incentivised by subsidies and regulatory design. The result is a transfer of assets from individuals to corporations, and from distributed ownership to concentrated control.
The language around BTR, including “professionally managed,” “stable tenancies,” and “quality rental stock,” frames permanent renting as desirable. It redefines housing as a service rather than an asset. It normalises a future in which an entire generation doesn’t own property but instead subscribes to it through corporate landlords.
This isn’t a conspiracy. It’s observable policy architecture.
When you abolish negative gearing for private investors whilst preserving it for institutions, you’re engineering a transfer of ownership. When you offer land tax concessions exclusively to developments of more than 50 units held by single entities, you’re structurally excluding small operators. When you position BTR as a housing solution whilst it delivers institutional returns and premium rents, you’re rebranding wealth extraction as social infrastructure.
The WEF doesn’t impose policy. It establishes frameworks. It convenes stakeholders. It publishes reports that become talking points and policy templates. The ideas filter through OECD working groups, treasury departments, industry consultations, and eventually into budget announcements.
Australia’s BTR policy didn’t emerge in a vacuum. It mirrors patterns in the UK, Canada, and parts of Europe, where similar tax structures have been introduced to favour institutional landlords over private ownership. Australia is adopting the same playbook, with the same outcomes.
The outcome is the same everywhere. Homeownership rates decline. Rental dependency increases. Wealth concentration accelerates.
If you wanted to design a system in which the majority of people own nothing and rent from a small number of institutional landlords, this is exactly what you would build.
Key Point: The WEF “own nothing” framework and Australia’s BTR policy architecture are functionally identical. One is ideological framing; the other is the operational delivery mechanism.
Who Actually Wins From BTR?
Corporate BTR operators: tax concessions, land tax discounts, and favourable MIT structures. They still charge premium rents.
Renters: Longer leases, professionally managed stock, at higher cost, with reduced pathways to ownership.
Government: Appears to be solving the housing crisis without constructing public housing.
Institutional investors: Stable, modest, tax-advantaged yields. Long-term control over the housing stock.
The answer to “who benefits?” is not renters.
The purpose of land tax concessions is to incentivise institutional investment in housing and construction, increase the rental supply, and improve rental choice. The reduced withholding tax is particularly important for attracting foreign capital to the BTR sector. The majority of significant BTR projects announced involve foreign capital partners.
Co-living is largely a design-and-density play. Build-to-rent is a long-term ownership and tax-policy play.
Key Point: BTR benefits corporate operators, institutional investors, and government optics. Renters get longer leases at a higher cost. Private developers and working-class investors get nothing.
What Would Actually Help Housing Affordability
Withdraw corporate BTR tax subsidies. Let true market supply and demand operate.
Radically reduce planning red tape and environmental compliance burdens. NatHERS, BASIX, Green Star requirements, and additional studies double DA timeframes and incur substantial consultant and holding costs.
Obtaining approvals for construction projects can take up to 18 months. Tightened energy efficiency and accessibility standards require more expensive materials and more complex engineering solutions.
Construction costs in Australia have risen twice as fast as inflation over the past decade. They’re now 40% higher than those in the US.
Simpler, faster approvals and lower upfront compliance costs would unlock a more feasible, privately funded housing supply than complex BTR concessions targeted at large institutions.
The RBA’s industry liaison identified limited availability of suitable development sites and the time and complexity of obtaining planning approvals as the most significant supply-side constraints on new apartment construction.
If we’re serious about housing affordability for Australians, we don’t need more tax-engineered products for offshore pension funds. We need fewer barriers for the Australian developers and individual investors who have always housed this country.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Build-to-Rent truly affordable housing?
No. Only 10% of units in a BTR development are required to rent at 74.9% of the market rate. The remaining 90% are priced at full market or premium rates. The affordability component is cross-subsidised by higher-cost units, making it a marketing label rather than a genuine affordability mechanism.
Who is excluded from BTR tax concessions?
Any developer or investor below the 50-dwelling threshold is excluded. This means that most private developers undertaking infill projects of 10 to 40 units, individual property investors, family trusts, and small partnerships cannot access any BTR tax benefits.
How do the 2026-27 CGT changes affect individual investors compared with companies?
From 1 July 2027, individuals lose the 50% CGT discount and face a 30% minimum tax on capital gains. Companies are unaffected, as they already pay 30% on full gains with no discount. The Budget equalised the tax burden on individuals without granting them any of the institutional advantages that corporations retain.
What is the negative gearing change and who does it affect?
From 1 July 2027, investors who purchased established residential properties after 7:30 pm on 12 May 2026 can no longer offset rental losses against salary or other personal income. However, BTR structures and widely held trusts are exempt from this restriction.
What was the March 2026 MoU, and why does it matter?
On 4 March 2026, a group of major Australian superannuation funds and Canadian pension funds signed a Memorandum of Understanding to collaborate on infrastructure investments and to lobby for policy changes. Eight weeks later, the Federal Budget delivered the exact BTR-friendly policy changes these institutions had sought. The MoU provides documented evidence of coordinated institutional lobbying that preceded and likely influenced Budget policy.
What is the WEF connection to Australian BTR policy?
The World Economic Forum’s 2016 prediction that “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” envisages a future of institutional asset ownership and individual reliance on rentals. Australia’s BTR policy architecture, including subsidies for institutional landlords and tax disadvantages for private investors, mirrors this vision in practice.
What would actually improve housing affordability in Australia?
Drawing on my 40 years of development experience, the most effective measures would be to remove BTR corporate tax subsidies, reduce planning red tape, shorten DA approval timeframes from the current up to 18-month period, and lower upfront compliance costs. These changes would unlock private development capacity without requiring taxpayer-funded concessions to institutional capital.
Does BTR increase housing supply?
Marginally. Australia currently has around 23,000 BTR apartments in operation, under construction, or in planning, representing approximately 0.2% of the residential housing sector. Meanwhile, policy settings that enable BTR actively discourage private development, which delivers the vast majority of new housing supply.
Key Takeaways
- BTR is a tax-advantaged financial product, not a genuine housing affordability solution. It only works through premium rents and tax engineering.
- The BTR concession framework is designed for institutional capital. The 50-dwelling minimum threshold explicitly excludes small private developers, who build most of Australia’s housing.
- The 2026-27 Budget removed negative gearing and the 50% CGT discount for individuals. Companies and institutional BTR structures are exempt from both changes.
- The March 2026 MoU between Australian super funds and Canadian pension funds provides documented evidence of coordinated institutional lobbying that preceded the Budget’s BTR-friendly policies by eight weeks.
- The WEF’s “own nothing” ideology and Australia’s BTR policy architecture are functionally identical in outcome: institutional ownership replaces private ownership, and renting replaces wealth accumulation.
- Working-class Australians have lost their primary wealth-creation pathway. Property investment was the only accessible way for wage earners to build assets, generate retirement income, and pass wealth to their children.
- The solution isn’t more tax-engineered products. It’s fewer barriers for private developers and individual investors who have always actually housed Australians.
About the Author
Steve Chandler is a third-generation property developer with over 40 years of practical experience in residential, commercial, industrial, medical, infrastructure, and public building projects throughout Australia.
As CEO of LEFTA Group of Companies, Steve specialises in property development advisory, consultancy, strategy, and training, with particular expertise in residential projects ranging from 30 to 80 apartments.
Professional Experience
Steve’s career started in 1980, giving him four decades of hands-on involvement in all aspects of property development. His experience covers:
- Project feasibility study and risk evaluation
- Development strategy and implementation
- Contract negotiation and project recovery
- Regulatory compliance and approval from authorities
- Budget management and cost control
Throughout his career, Steve has developed a systematic method for identifying structural weaknesses in project setup stages, helping prevent cost blowouts before they occur.
Teaching and Knowledge Sharing
Steve has shared his expertise as a lecturer at the University of NSW and as the founder of Property Development Institute, teaching property development principles to aspiring developers. He authored “From Building Worrier to Building Warrior: Taking The Worry Out Of Building” (available on Amazon), which documents research into renovation loan patterns and budget management strategies.
His teaching philosophy focuses on turning theoretical knowledge into practical, actionable strategies that avoid common development failures.
Specialisation and Methodology
Steve’s approach to property development highlights:
- Conduct thorough research upfront before acquiring property.
- Comprehensive feasibility assessments covering 15-20 cost categories
- Choose risk relocation instead of risk avoidance
- Complete project documentation to prevent scope creep.
- Strategic contract structuring with protective special conditions
His methodology relies on pattern recognition from decades of observing what distinguishes successful projects (22% that stay on budget) from failed ones (78% that experience cost overruns).
Industry Acknowledgement
Steve’s expertise is highly valued by property developers tackling complex, high-stakes projects where standard methods fall short. His work concentrates on:
- Preventing budget blowouts through intervention during the setup phase
- Revitalising struggling projects through strategic restructuring
- Guiding developers in conducting professional-grade feasibility analyses
- Engineering project conditions where success is guaranteed
Geographic Focus
Based in Australia, Steve’s expertise is rooted in the Australian property development scene, including NSW regulatory rules, standard building contracts (NSW Fair Trading, Master Builders Association, Housing Industry Association, Australian Standards), and Australian tax considerations for property development.
Contact Details and Additional Information
Steve Chandler works with property developers through LEFTA Group of Companies, offering strategic advice, project consultation, and professional mentorship for those dedicated to approaching property development as a profession rather than speculation.
His insights are shaped by hands-on involvement in hundreds of projects across residential, commercial, and mixed-use developments, along with research into industry-wide trends of success and failure.
Conflict-of-Interest & Commercial Disclosure: LEFTA Corporation Pty Ltd advises clients across Australia and may seek future joint-venture opportunities at some of the sites discussed. Views expressed are personal and do not represent any current client mandate.
General Advice Disclaimer: This article is based upon the personal experiences of the Author. No portion of this article is intended to provide legal, financial or professional advice. The information contained herein is not a substitute or replacement for the services of qualified professionals, legal, financial and insurance experts. The Author, its publisher, agents, servants, contractors, employees and representatives will, under no circumstances, be liable for any special or consequential damages that result from the use of, or any attempt to use, the information contained herein. You are solely responsible and accountable for any actions, decisions and results by your use of the information contained herein. You agree not to attempt to hold the Author and LEFTA Corporation Pty Ltd liable for any such decisions, actions or results, at any time, under any circumstances.
